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Building on similarities between earthquakes and extreme financial events, we use a self-organized
criticality-generating model to study herding and avalanche dynamics in financial markets. We
consider a community of interacting investors, distributed on a small-world network, who bet on
the bullish (increasing) or bearish (decreasing) behavior of the market which has been specified
according to the S&P500 historical time series. Remarkably, we find that the size of herding-related
avalanches in the community can be strongly reduced by the presence of a relatively small percentage
of traders, randomly distributed inside the network, who adopt a random investment strategy. Our
findings suggest a promising strategy to limit the size of financial bubbles and crashes. We also
obtain that the resulting wealth distribution of all traders corresponds to the well-known Pareto
power law, while the one of random traders is exponential. In other words, for technical traders, the
risk of losses is much greater than the probability of gains compared to those of random traders.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh,89.65.Gh, 05.65.+b
Financial markets often experience extremes, called
“bubbles” and “crashes”. The underlying dynamics is
related to avalanches, the size of which is distributed
according to power laws [1–8]. Power laws imply that
crashes may reach any size—a circumstance that may
threaten the functionality of the entire financial system.
Many scientists see “herding behavior” as the origin of
such dangerous avalanches [9–16]. In our paper, we ex-
plore whether there is a mechanism that could stop or
reduce them.
To generate a power-law dynamics similar to the
volatility clustering in financial markets, we use an agent-
based model that produces the phenomenon of self-
organized criticality (SOC) [17]. Specifically, we adapt
the Olami-Feder-Chrstensen (OFC) model [18, 19] that
has been proposed to describe the dynamics of earth-
quakes [6, 20]. In this context, we assume information
cascades between agents [21] as the underlying mech-
anism of financial avalanches. We assume that agents
interact within a small-world (SW) network of financial
trading [22] and that there is social influence among them
[23, 24]. Such kinds of models are recently becoming
popular in economics [25] and herding effects are also
beginning to be observed in lab experiments [26]. In this
connection, it is interesting to consider that humans tend
to orient themselves at decisions and behaviors of others,
particularly in situations where it is not clear what is the
right thing to do [27]. Such conditions are typical for
financial markets, in particular during volatile periods.
In fact, in situations of high uncertainty, personal infor-
mation exchange may reach market-wide impacts, as the
examples of bank runs [28] and speculative attacks on
national currencies [29] show.
Our study explores how huge herding avalanches in
financial trading might be reduced by introducing a cer-
tain percentage of traders who adopt a random invest-
ment strategy. Actually, several analogies between socio-
economic and physical or biological systems have recently
been discussed [30–33], where noise and randomness can
have beneficial effects, improving the performance of the
system [34–42]. More specifically, in a recent series of
papers, it has been explored whether the adoption of
random strategies may be advantageous in financial trad-
ing from an individual point of view. Scientific evidence
suggests that, in the long term, random trading strate-
gies are less risky for a single trader, but provide, on
average, gains comparable to those obtained by technical
strategies [43, 44]. Therefore, one might expect that a
certain percentage of investors would consider the pos-
sibility of adopting a random trading strategy. Assum-
ing this and using real data sets of the S&P500 index,
we here extend our previous analysis to a sample com-
munity of interacting investors. We investigate whether
the presence of randomly distributed agents performing
random investments influences the formation of herding-
related avalanches and how the wealth of the traders
is distributed. We show that the presence of random
traders is able to reduce financial avalanches, which we
call - in analogy with earthquakes - ’financial quakes’.
Furthermore, we find that the wealth distribution, even
if normally distributed in the beginning, spontaneously
evolves towards the well-known Pareto power law. Fi-
nally, we address possible policy implications.
I. THE MODEL
The Financial Quakes Model (FQM) that we introduce
in this paper is defined on a small-world (SW) network
[22] of N agents Ai (”traders”). The total number of
traders considered is always N = 1600. Note that the
purpose of this model is to generate volatility cluster-
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2FIG. 1: Small-world 2D network of N traders, as used in
our numerical simulations (here N = 500 as an example, but
in the simulations we always considered N = 1600 agents).
Short-range and long-range links are simultaneously present.
White agents are RSI traders (active agents assumed to follow
the standard Relative Strength Index (RSI) trading strategy);
colored agents (10% of the total) are random traders, here
uniformly distributed at random among the population. See
text for further details.
ing and power-law distributed avalanche sizes in a simple
way, while we are not interested in formulating a realis-
tic micro-model of financial markets or to reproduce the
exact power-law exponents. The purpose of our study
is to explore possible ways to destroy dangerous herding
effects by simple and effective means.
In our FQM model, each agent carries a given quan-
tity of information about the financial market considered.
The SW network is obtained from a square 2-dimensional
40 × 40 lattice with open boundary conditions, by ran-
domly rewiring the nearest neighbors links with a prob-
ability of p = 0.02 (see Fig.1). The resulting network
topology allows the information to spread over the lat-
tice through long-range links, but also preserves the clus-
tering properties of the network and its average degree
(< k >= 4).
The information spreading is simulated by associat-
ing to each trader a real variable Ii(t) (i = 1, 2, ..., N),
representing the information possessed at time t, which
initially (at t = 0) is set to a random value in the interval
(0, Ith). Ith = 1.0 is a threshold value that is assumed
to be the same for all agents. At each discrete time step
t > 0, due to public external information sources, all
these variables are simultaneously increased by a quan-
tity δIi, which is different for each agent and randomly
extracted within the interval [0, (Ith − Imax(t))], where
Imax(t) = max{Ii(t)} is the maximum value of the
FIG. 2: (a) S&P 500 index data used in this paper, with 5750
daily index entries Ej (from September 11, 1989, to June 29,
2012). (b) Corresponding (relative) returns time series, where
returns are defined as the ratio (Ej+1 − Ej)/Ej .
agents’ information at time t.
If, at a given time step t∗, the information Ik(t∗) of one
or more agents {Ak}k=1,...,K exceeds the threshold value
Ith, these agents become ”active” and take the decision
of investing a given quantity of money by betting on the
bullish (increasing) or bearish (decreasing) behavior of
the market compared to the day before. As mentioned
before, we consider here as a typical example the S&P
500 index. The time period ranges from September 11,
1989, to June 29, 2012, over a total of T = 5750 daily
index values Ej (see Fig. 2). Notice that the use of this
particular series has no special reasons, it just serves to
ensure only a realistic market dynamics as input. Other
indexes have also been tested with similar results.
In order to make their prediction Pj (positive or nega-
tive) about the sign of the index difference (Ej−Ej−1) at
time t∗, active agents are assumed to follow the standard
Relative Strength Index (RSI) trading strategy, based on
the ratio between the sum of positive returns and the
sum of negative returns experienced during the last τRSI
days (here we choose τRSI = 14; see Ref. [44] for further
details of the RSI algorithm). As for the time series con-
sidered, this strategy has nothing special and has been
chosen just because it is a commonly used technical strat-
egy in the trading community.
For financial traders, it is often beneficial to be fol-
lowed by others, as this increases the likelihood that
their investments will be profitable or because they are
friends/colleagues and it would be considered appropri-
ate to share part of their own information. Therefore,
we assume that the agents, once activated, will transfer
some information to the neighbors according the follow-
ing herding mechanism:
Ik > Ith ⇒
{
Ik → 0,
Inn → Inn + αNnn Ik.
(1)
Here “nn” denotes the set of nearest-neighbors of the ac-
3FIG. 3: Size of avalanches (“financial quakes”) occurring in
our artificial financial market. Both positive cascades (“bub-
bles”) and negative avalanches (“crashes”) are found. See
text for further details.
tive agent Ak. Nnn is the number of direct neighbors,
and the parameter α controls the level of dissipation
of the information during the dynamics (α = 1 corre-
sponds to the conservative case). In analogy with the
OFC model for earthquakes [19, 22], we set here α = 0.84
(non-conservative case), i.e. we consider some informa-
tion loss during the herding process. This value of α has
been chosen here to drive the system in a critical state
and to obtain large avalanches, since our goal is to study
how these avalanches can be reduced by the introduction
of random traders.
Of course, the herding rule (1) can activate other
agents, thereby producing a chain reaction. The resulting
information avalanche may be called a “financial quake”:
all the agents that are above the threshold become ac-
tive and invest simultaneously according to Eq. (1), such
that the agent Ak bets with the same prediction Pj as
the agent from which they have received the information.
The financial quake is over, when there are no more ac-
tive agents in the system (i.e. when Ii < Ith ∀i). Then,
the prediction Pj is finally compared with the sign of
(Ej−Ej−1): if they are in agreement, all the agents who
have contributed to the avalanche win, otherwise they
lose. In any case, the process of information cascades
build up again due to the random public ”information
pressure” acting on the system. The number of invest-
ments (i.e. the number of active agents) during a single
financial quake define the avalanche size s.
In the next section we present several simulation re-
sults obtained by running this model many times, start-
ing each time from a new random initial distribution of
the information Ii(0) shared among the agents. We as-
sume that the avalanche process within our sample trad-
ing community does not influence the whole market, i.e.
does not have any effect on the behavior of the finan-
FIG. 4: Cumulative distribution of the sizes (absolute val-
ues) of herding avalanches occurring in the community of in-
vestors, with and without random traders. In the absence of
random traders (open circles) he distribution obeys a power
law with an exponent equal to -1.87 (a fit is also reported
as a straight line). Considering increasing amount of random
traders, i.e. 2% (diamonds), 5% (squares), 8% (full circles)
and 10% (triangles), the distribution tends to become expo-
nential for sufficiently large percentage of random investors.
An exponential fit with exponent equal to −0.2 is also found
for the latter case. In these simulations the random traders
are uniformly distributed (at random) over the network, as in
Fig.1. For further details see the main text.
cial series considered, even if we imagine that the mar-
ket does exert some influence on our community through
”the information pressure” δIi. On the other hand, this
pressure, being random and different for each agent, is
also independent from the financial time series consid-
ered (here the S&P500).
In a way, this scenario could be considered analogous
to the physical situation of a small closed thermodynam-
ical system in contact with a very large energy reser-
voir (environment), typical for statistical mechanics in
the canonical ensemble: even if the system can exchange
energy with the environment, it is too small to have any
influence on the reservoir itself.
II. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Fig. 3 we plot the time sequence s(t) of the “fi-
nancial quake” sizes during a single simulation run. A
positive sign means that all the involved agents win and
a negative sign that they loose. Each avalanche corre-
sponds to an entry of the S&P 500 index series, since
each initial investment (“bet”) on the market coincides
with the occurrence of a financial quake (this means that
the series in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 have the same length T ). In
analogy with the SOC behavior characterizing the OFC
4FIG. 5: Behavior of the maximum size of avalanches as a
function of an increasing number of random traders, for three
different ways of spreading them over the network: randomly
distributed (circles), grouped in one community (squares) and
grouped in four communities (diamonds). The results were
averaged over 10 different realizations, each one with a differ-
ent initial random position of traders and communities within
the network.
model, we observe a sequence of quakes that increases
in size over time. In other words, the financial system
is progressively driven into a critical-like state, where
herding-related avalanches of any size can occur: most
of them will be quite small, but sometimes a very big
financial quake appears, involving a herding cascade of
bets, which can be either profitable (positive) or lossfull
(negative). Notice that the daily data of the S&P 500 se-
ries only affect the sign of the avalanches in Fig. 3, while
their sizes strictly depend on the internal dynamics of
our small trading community considered. Therefore, as
we verified with several simulations not reported here,
reshuffling data or removing extreme events in the S&P
500 series would not produce any change in the sizes of
the financial quakes.
The SOC-like nature of this dynamics is well shown
in Fig. 4, where we report the probability distribution
PN (s) of financial quakes size, measured by its absolute
value and cumulated over 10 simulations (open circles).
The resulting distribution can be very well fitted by a
power-law PN (s) ∝ s−1.87, a slope consistent with the
one obtained for earthquakes in the OFC model on a SW
topology (see [22]).
Let us now discuss what happens if a certain number of
agents in the network adopt a random trading strategy,
i.e. if they invest in a completely random way instead
of following the standard RSI strategy. We have already
shown [44] that an individual random trading strategy,
if played along the whole S&P 500 series (and also along
other European financial indices), performs as well as
various standard trading strategies (such as RSI, MACD
or Momentum [44]), but it is less risky than other strate-
FIG. 6: Two different examples of small-world 2D networks,
with N = 500 agents as in Fig. 1, but where random traders
(colored agents, 10% of the total) are grouped in one commu-
nity (left panel) or four communities (right panel) , respec-
tively.
gies. Here, we study whether a widespread adoption
of such a random investment strategy would also have
a beneficial (collective) effect at the macro-level (where
other important phenomena like herding, asymmetric in-
formation or rational bubbles may matter). Would ran-
dom investment strategies reduce the level of volatility
and induce a greater stability of financial markets?
In the following, we test this hypothesis by introducing
a certain percentage PRND of random traders (colored
agents in Fig.1), uniformly distributed at random among
the N = 1600 investors. We assume that all agents are
aware of the trading strategy (RSI or random) adopted
by their respective neighbors. In this respect it is worth-
while to stress again that, in our model, traders behave
according to a bounded rationality framework with no
feedback mechanism on the market. Note that, in con-
trast to RSI traders, random traders are not activated
by their neighbors, since they invest at random. We also
assume that they do not activate their neighbors, since
a random trader has no specific information to transfer.
In other words, random traders only receive information
from external sources, but do not exchange individual
information with other agents apart from the fact that
they bet at random. In order to simulate random in-
vestors within our model, we simply set α = 0 for them
in Eq. (1). This means that random traders (when they
overcome their information threshold) can invest their
capital exactly in the same way as other agents, but
they do not take part in any herding-related activation
avalanche.
Coming back again to Fig. 4, one can see the effect
of an increasing percentage PRND of random traders
on the size distribution of financial quakes. Besides
the power-law curve already discussed, corresponding to
PRND = 0%, we report also the results obtained con-
sidering different percentages of random traders, when
namely 2% (diamonds), 5% (squares), 8% (full circles)
and 10% (triangles). The data show that the original
power-law distribution evolves towards an exponential
5FIG. 7: Capital/wealth distribution of all agents at the end
of the simulation, cumulated over 10 realizations, for a net-
work with various percentages of uniformly distributed ran-
dom traders. In any case we had a Pareto-like power law with
an exponent of −2.4, independently of the amount of random
traders considered.
one. An exponential fit with an exponent equal to -0.2
(dashed-dotted curve) is also reported for the maximum
number of random traders considered by us, i.e. 10%.
One can also investigate how the size of the avalanche
changes with the increase of the amount of random
traders considered, if they are uniformly distributed over
the network. This is shown in Fig.5 (full circles), where
one can see that the maximum size of the avalanches ob-
served drops by a factor of 5 in the presence of only 5% of
random traders, reaching almost its final saturation level
of 3% when PRND = 10%. These results indicate that
even a relatively small number of random investors dis-
tributed at random within the market is able to suppress
dangerous herding-related avalanches. But what would
happen if these random traders, instead of being uni-
formly distributed at random over the population, were
grouped together in one or more communities?
In Fig.6 we show two examples of small-world networks
with 10% random traders (colored agents) grouped in one
or four communities, respectively (for clarity, we use the
same sample network as in Fig.1, with N = 500). If
one repeats the previous simulations for our network of
N = 1600 agents with an increasing percentage of ran-
dom traders, but now grouping these traders together
in either one community or four communities, respec-
tively, the result is that the original power law distribu-
tion of avalanches is less affected by random investments
for any percentage PRND. This, in turn, implies a slower
decrease of the maximum avalanche sizes as PRND in-
creases, as shown again in Fig.5 (squares and diamonds,
respectively). This means that the uniform random dis-
tribution of random investors over the whole network is
quite crucial in order to significantly dampen avalanche
formation (notice that a percentage between 1% and 2%
of uniformly distributed random traders is enough to re-
duce the financial quakes size as much as 10% grouped
random investors would do). In this respect, the effect
of random traders is to increase the frequency of small
financial quakes and, consequently, avoid the occurrence
of large ones.
It is also interesting to study the capital gain or loss,
i.e. the change in wealth, of the agents involved in
the trading process during the whole period considered
(in the following we will use the terms ”capital” and
”wealth” synonymously). At the beginning of each sim-
ulation, we assign to each trader (RSI or random) an
initial capital Ci according to a normal distribution with
an average of < C >= 1000 credits and a standard de-
viation equal to 0.1 < C >. Then we let them invest in
the market according to the following rules:
- if an agent wins thanks to a given bet (for example
after being involved in a given, big or small, positive
financial quake), in the next investment he will bet a
quantity δCi of money equal to one half of his/her total
capital Ci, i.e. δCi = 0.5Ci;
- if an agent loses due to an unsuccessful investment
(for example after a negative financial quake), the next
time he will invest only ten percent of his/her total capi-
tal, i.e. δCi = 0.1Ci. We have checked, however, that our
result are quite robust to adopting a number of different
investment criteria.
After a financial quake, the capital of each agent in-
volved in the herding-related avalanche will increase or
decrease by the quantity δCi. Of course random traders,
who do not take part in avalanches, can invest. Their
wealth changes only when they overcome their informa-
tion threshold due to the external information sources. In
Fig.7 we show the distribution of the total wealth cumu-
lated by all agents during the whole sequence of financial
quakes, i.e. over the whole S&P 500 series (cumulated
over 10 different runs), for three different trading net-
works with increasing percentages of random investors
(namely, 0%, 5% and 10%). Interestingly, a Pareto power
law [45–47] with an exponent equal to −2.4 (see the fit
reported as dashed line) emerges spontaneously from the
dynamics of the asymmetric investments, independently
of the number of random traders. We have checked that
this result is quite robust and does not substantially
change if we modify the quantity δCi that agents choose
to invest in case of a win or a loss.
It is also interesting to study the wealth distribution
of the random investors in case of a network with 10%
random traders (results are cumulated over 10 realiza-
tions). This is reported in Fig.8, in comparison with the
corresponding distribution already shown in the previous
figure for the whole trading community. As one can see
from the plot, random traders have a final wealth dis-
tribution very different from a power law, which can be
fitted very well with an exponential curve, represented by
a dashed line, with an exponent equal to −0.00134 (the
fact that the random traders component is not changing
the global power law distribution of Fig.7 is evidently
6FIG. 8: Comparison between the final capital/wealth dis-
tribution for the whole trading network with 10% of random
traders shown in Fig.7 (reported again as square symbols) and
the same distribution for the random traders component only
(full circles). The latter can be fitted with an exponential
distribution, also reported as dashed line, with an exponent
equal to −0.00134. We also report the average capital calcu-
lated over all the traders (767 credits) and over the random
traders only (923 credits).See text for details.
due to its small size, i.e. 160 agents as compared to
1600). In addition, we compare average final wealth of
all the traders, 767 credits, with the average wealth of
random investors only, 923 credits. This should be com-
pared with the initial value of the capital which is 1000
credits. Therefore 14% of RSI traders have more wealth
in the end than in the beginning, whereas the analogous
percentage for random traders is 26%.
These findings allow us to extend our previous results
for single traders [44] to collective effects in a commu-
nity of traders . In fact, they suggest that the adoption
of random strategies would diminish the probability of
extreme events, in this case large increases or losses of
wealth, but also ensure almost the same average wealth
over a long time period, at variance with technical strate-
gies. In particular, looking at the details of the two dis-
tribution shown in Fig.8, we also find that 40% of RSI
traders have a final capital smaller than the worst ran-
dom trader, whereas only 3% of RSI traders perform bet-
ter than the best random trader. This means that, for
technical traders, the risk of losses is much greater than
the probability of gains, compared to those of random
investors. Random trading seems therefore, after all, a
very good combination of low risk and high performance.
Before closing this section we note that all the numer-
ical simulations presented are quite robust and that sim-
ilar results were obtained adopting other historical time
series, such as, for example, FTSE UK or FTSE Mib.
III. DISCUSSION AND POTENTIAL POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Even though our results were obtained for a “toy
model” of financial trading, we think that they have po-
tentially interesting policy implications.
According to the conventional assumption, neither
bubbles or crashes should occur when all agents are pro-
vided with the same complete and credible set of infor-
mation about monetary and asset values traded in the
market. This is the basis of the well-known Efficient Mar-
ket Hypothesis [48], based on the paradigm of Rational
Expectations [49]. Bubbles and crashes should also not
occur according to the wide-spread Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilbrium (DSGE) Models [50–53]. However,
the wisdom of crowds effect, which induces the equilib-
rium price, can be undermined by information feedbacks
and social influence [54]. Such social influence may lead
to bubbles and crashes.
To account for herding effects, researchers have started
to propose concepts such as “rational bubbles” [55], rec-
ognizing that it can be profitable to follow a trend. How-
ever, on average, trend-following is not more successful
than random investments — it is rather more risky [44].
From human psychology, we know that people tend to fol-
low others, i.e. to show herding behavior, if it is not clear
what is the right thing to do [56]. This fact establishes
that many traders will be susceptible to the trading de-
cisions of others. It seems realistic to assume that each
agent is endowed with a different quantity and quality
of information, coming from private information sources
with different reputation, depending on the agents’ po-
sition in the network (see e.g. Refs. [57–63]). How-
ever, such information feedbacks may be harmful, par-
ticularly when the market is flooded with volatile and
self-referential information.
Our paper supports the hypothesis [64] that introduc-
ing “noisy trading” (i.e. random investors) in financial
markets can destroy bubbles and crashes before they be-
come large, and thereby avoid dangerous avalanches. By
preventing extreme price variations, random investments
also help to identify the equilibrium price [65]. It seems
that already a small number of random investors (relative
to the total number of agents) would be enough to have
a beneficial effect on the financial market, particularly if
distributed at random. Such investors could be central
banks, but also large investors, including pension funds
or hedge funds with an interest in reducing the risks of
their investments.
We are aware that further studies with more sophis-
ticated and realistic models of financial markets should
be performed to explore the full potentials and limita-
tions of random investment strategies. However, our re-
sults suggest that random investments will always reduce
both the size and frequency of bubbles/crashes. Further
research will be devoted to understanding the most op-
portune timing for the introduction of such random in-
vestments and whether this innovative policy instrument
7can enable a smooth control of financial markets, thereby
reducing their fragility.
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